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BETTER LIVING THROUGH CRIME AND TORT
ANITA BERNSTEIN*
Every law pertaining to crime or tort originates from a conjunction of
optimism and political power. Crimes and torts-especially in a legalis-
tic, democratic, secular, liberal-pluralist setting such as the United
States-are human artifacts, created in the hope of improving social
existence. Occasionally citizens engage in the task of changing the law of
crime and tort to cure a social ill that they have perceived. Their efforts
are the subjects of this Paper. For specificity and to tie my thesis togeth-
er, I use as examples three American social-political-legal events: the at-
tack on pornography led by feminists,' the movement against cigarette
smoking,2 and citizens' campaigns aimed at reducing the harm attributed
to liquor.'
* Associate Professor of Law and Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar, Chicago-
Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. I acknowledge with thanks the
contributions of Lori Andrews, Evelyn Brody, Steven Heyman, Kelly Kleiman, James
Lindgren, Martin Malin, Richard McAdams, and numerous Chicago-Kent colleagues
who offered pertinent ideas at a roundtable discussion.
1 DANY LACOMBE, BLUE POLITICS: PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW IN THE AGE OF
FEMINISM 5 (1994) ("Feminists replaced sex with sexism as the focus of the pornogra-
phy debate."). Some other ideological efforts against pornography also fit within my
subject, but I have chosen to focus on the feminist attack to keep the example more
compact.
2 See generally PETER D. JACOBSON ET AL., THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF ANTIs-
MOKING LEGISLATION 34-44 (1992) (connecting legislative reform with increased ant-
ismoking sentiment and popular activism); Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Histori-
cal Perspectives on Tobacco Tort Liability, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND
CULTURE 111-12 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993) (attributing
the first wave of tobacco litigation to a series of articles in the Reader's Digest linking
smoking to lung cancer); Cassandra Tate, In the 1800s, Antismoking Was a Burning
Issue, SMITHSONIAN, May 1989, at 107, 107 (describing the anti-smoking movement
early this century, which culminated when ten states prohibited the sale, manufacture,
or possession of cigarettes).
3 See generally Paul Aaron & David Musto, Temperance and Prohibition in
America: A Historical Overview, in ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY: BEYOND THE
SHADOW OF PROHIBITION (Mark H. Moore & Dean R. Gerstein eds., 1981) [hereinaf-
ter ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY] (examining alcohol policy options). See also John
M. Faust, Note, Of Saloons and Social Control: Assessing the Impact of State Liquor
Control on Individual Expression, 80 VA. L. REv. 745, 746 (1994) [hereinafter Faust
Note] (arguing that public ambivalence about alcohol control "has resulted in the
quiet intrusion" of government regulation into "a vulnerable sphere of individual
rights").
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Crusades of this type engage the legal system in what I call melioristic
law reform, a sub-genre of law reform aimed at social progress.4 Melio-
ristic law reform has many antagonists. Across the political spectrum,
critics complain: Melioristic law reform is too powerful, too weak, never
genuine or grass-rooted but rather a statist fraud, destructive of
communities, counterproductive, legalistic, tyrannical, and trivial.5 Al-
bert Hirschman's concise phrase, "perversity, futility, jeopardy,"6 sums up
what critics say about melioristic law reform; although all three alarms
are worth attention, jeopardy seems to be the gravest risk and the most
powerful criticism. Despite this hostility, however, melioristic law reform
flourishes in the United States. The task of trying to explain its appeal
and persistence yields something of a response to critics.
My premise is that the intersection-here I mean combination and
4 1 use "melioristic law reform" to mean citizen-driven law reform that proposes
changes to the law of both crime and tort. The adjective "melioristic" refers to the
hopes of proponents and is not intended to imply that the proposal is necessarily a
good idea. For a persuasive critique of law reform, see Richard A. Posner, The De-
cline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 769-70
(1987) (arguing that traditional justifications for faith in law's autonomy as a disci-
pline have been seriously undermined by a "series of confidence-shattering events,"
particularly the unforeseen harms of reforms in bankruptcy law, no-fault divorce, en-
vironmental regulation, and class actions, among other reforms).
"Melioristic law reform" is distinguishable from "cause lawyering." For extensive
description of the latter, see generally JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978) (ex-
amining such law-based social crusades as environmental litigation, consumer protec-
tion, civil rights, and social welfare). Scholarly treatments of cause lawyering discuss
the theory and practice of achieving social change with the cooperation of an energet-
ic judiciary. Cause lawyering is concerned generally with group-identified allocations
of resources. In contrast, melioristic law reform, as I see it, consists of efforts to im-
prove individual behavior through changes in tort and criminal law. Rather than
seeking distributive justice via judicial decision, melioristic law reform emphasizes
change through the political process at the individual level. These two conceptions of
reform reflect their respective eras: Cause lawyering flourished in the expansionist
1970s, whereas melioristic law reform is suited to the current decline of judicial activ-
ism.
5 See infra notes 54-71 and accompanying text. In addition to other critical writ-
ings that I will discuss below, work in this tradition includes GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 336-37 (1991)
(concluding that without political support, effective implementation mechanisms, and
established precedents to lend legitimacy to their decisions, courts have been relative-
ly ineffectual in producing significant social change); see also MARY ANN GLENDON,
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE at xii
(1991) (contending that legalism's preoccupation with rights expresses American indi-
vidualism but ignores "our traditions of hospitality and care for the community").
6 See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILI-
TY, JEOPARDY 133 (1991).
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conjunction-of crime and tort is a useful lens-like device to study law
reform, because movements that seek to change both the law of crime7
and tort represent law reform at its utmost: that is, its most comprehen-
sive and intrusive. Whereas other types of law reform (such as changes to
the tax law or court procedures) may have important effects, a reform
that tries to change both the law of crime and tort reveals its ambition to
reach intimately into individual lives. Thus anyone who is concerned
about jeopardy8 in law reform ought to worry especially about melioristic
law reform. And if melioristic law reform is defended successfully against
the charge of jeopardy, then all of law reform is defended, to a greater
extent.
How does the intersection of crime and tort coexist with reform move-
ments? The analysis offered here is functionalist:9 this Paper examines
7 Nine-tenths of animal species, it is said, are insects that even educated lay persons
have never heard of, and a similar proportion governs the American taxonomy of
crimes. Thus like most writers who discuss the criminal law, I work with a somewhat
blinkered definition of crime, one that overlooks the proliferation of technical crimes
and the tendency of lawmakers to criminalize violations of administrative law, to the
point where criminal penalties are attached to more than 300,000 federal regulations.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1880-81 (1992) (in-
ternal citation omitted). The idea of "crime" here is commonsensical; consistent with
my interest in social problems, I mean to refer to crimes that citizens understand and
take into account.
8 The jeopardy thesis "argues that the cost of the proposed change or reform is too
high as it endangers some previous, precious accomplishment." HIRSCHMAN, supra
note 6, at 7.
9 The reference to functionalism, a much-bandied word, requires a bit of definition
and a disclaimer. Following Talcott Parsons, I mean by functionalism the belief that
aspects of a society interrelate in purposive ways. Thus law reform movements and
the doctrines of crime and tort, both social institutions, work together. As a sociologi-
cal method, functionalism invites study of this working coexistence. In this Paper I
use functionalism in this narrow sense.
I also share Parsons's view that the center of society is found in institutional struc-
tures, even though individual persons make choices that are at least partially free.
Institutions help to determine the actions of individuals, and in turn these institutions
derive continuity from action. See TALCOTT PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL
ACTION 106 (1937) (discussing marriage and property as "institutional modes of regu-
lation of conduct"); cf. LACOMBE, supra note 1, at 139 (referring to "the mutually
constitutive nature of structure and agency"). I do not agree with much of what has
been said in the name of functionalism, including the prescriptive writings of Parsons.
See, e.g. TALCOTr PARSONS & ROBERT F. BALES, FAMILY, SOCIALIZATION AND IN-
TERACTION PROCESS 3-5 (1955) (suggesting that the historical increase in the divorce
rate in the United States constitutes part of a phase in which the nuclear family trans-
fers a variety of functions to other social institutions); Talcott Parsons, Age and Sex in
the Social Structure of the United States, 7 AM. Soc. REV. 604, 610 (1942) (arguing that
the social isolation of the conjugal family, of advanced age groups, and of middle class
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the intersection as a social phenomenon, and as it has been experienced.
Referring to the three examples mentioned above-the crusades against
pornography, smoking, and liquor-I note in Part I some defining traits
of melioristic law reform. Foremost of them is that although both crime
and tort are invoked, activists use crime and tort in a decentralized-even
haphazard-fashion. Social movements frequently outlive their foun-
ders, shift radically over the years, and attract a disparate membership.
Decentralization occurs because the rise of a social movement precedes
legal strategies.
A second identifier is stigma. When a social movement pursues change
in the law of both crime and tort, it also pursues extralegal sources of
social control. Though legalistic in the sense of wanting government and
society to conform to a law-centered model,"0 melioristic law reform also
aspires to educate, influence, and shame individuals. The Paper thus ex-
amines the effect of non-legal social controls on human behavior and how
those devices complement legal reform.
Other traits further identify melioristic law reform. Persons who lead
the movement, if they are not obscure, present themselves as reluctant
public figures. Although critics frequently impugn their motives, charg-
ing that reformers seek fame or power, these leaders lack a patent finan-
cial interest in the cause. Activists usually appeal to individual freedom,
in a somewhat defensive way: Aware that their project may not fit within
a tradition of negative liberties, they nevertheless use rights-rhetoric and
individualism in the discourse that they initiate.
In Part II, descriptive and normative claims come together, as I argue
that melioristic law reform is generally a desirable kind of democratic
expression. Whereupon two challenges emerge: Is melioristic law re-
form, in truth, democratic expression? And is it always a good thing?
Regarding the first, the descriptive challenge, I acknowledge that my
claim about "better living" through melioristic law reform depends on
some enthusiasm for democracy, notwithstanding that democracy often
falls from its ideals. The claim also derives from two strands of faith,
progressivism and secularism," and indicates that I am a pluralist, that is
married women can be attributed to the absence of formal age and sex differentia-
tion). For me, functionalism alone does not justify a status quo, and although I ap-
prove of the deployment of crime and tort by social movements, I regard the defense
of this connection as a task separate from functionalist description.
10 See JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., LAW IN RADICALLY DIFFERENT CULTURES 9
(1983) (explaining legalism as "the belief (and practice) that law should be the princi-
pal organizing framework of government and society").
11 For discussion of legal traditions contrary to progressivism and secularism, see
HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 7 (Beacon Press 1970) (1861) ("[I]n the infancy of
mankind, no sort of legislature, not even a distinct author of law, is contemplated or
conceived of... The only authoritative statement of right and wrong is a judicial
sentence after the facts. .. ").
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to say a believer that groups exist and share power.12 The transcendent
validity of progressivism, secularism, and pluralism certainly cannot be
proved. Progressivism-the tenet that society moves toward a better
state of earthly affairs-has been ascendant for less than four hundred
years.'" Only since the Enlightenment, moreover, has it been understood
that homo faber, rather than gods or a single Maker, builds positive law.'4
These beliefs site my arguments in their place and time."5 Continuing my
functionalist approach, however, I argue that progressivism, secularism,
and pluralism serve purposes.
There remains the question of whether it is a good thing for the rest of
us when activists engage the legal system, especially the law of crime and
tort, to achieve their goals. I do not presume to answer this question, and
try only to make some of the case for an affirmative response. Certainly
melioristic law reform is a source of harm. Consider again the preemi-
nence of jeopardy in the refrain of perversity, futility, and jeopardy.
Some social movements propound bad ideas. All successful social move-
ments intrude, coerce, and leave some people worse off. Melioristic law
reform, as was mentioned, represents social movements at their most in-
trusive and coercive.
For this reason the normative claims I make here are limited for the
most part to process virtues. Melioristic law reform engages the citizenry,
adjusts political power, provokes debate and critical thought, alleviates
isolation and anomie, and occupies a population in self-government.
Contrary to a view that I attribute to Professor Mary Ann Glendon and
others, this political and social use of law is at least consistent with, if not
conducive to, other civic endeavors associated with a thriving community.
The civic functions of melioristic law reform become more important as
other institutional sources of political engagement decline. Despite its
costs, melioristic law reform is part of the wealth of an affluent democra-
cy.
12 The literature on pluralism is vast. For an overview, see Louise Marcil-Lacoste,
The Paradoxes of Pluralism, in DIMENSIONS OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY: PLURALISM,
CITIZENSHIP, COMMUNITY 128-30 (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1992) [hereinafter RADICAL
DEMOCRACY] (collecting the major sources of pluralist thought in philosophy, ethics,
and political theory).
13 See JOHN BuRY, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 35-36 (1920) (identifying the origins of
progressivism in the first quarter of the seventeenth century).
14 See, e.g. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 1 (C.K. Ogden ed.,
1931) (1802) (directing legislators to make laws that "establish the unity and the sov-
ereignty" of the principle of utility).
15 See A.W.B. SIMPSON, INvrrATION TO LAW 16-17 (1988) (arguing that only re-
cently has law been seen as "an instrument for change, for reform, for improvement,
[and] for producing a different sort of society").
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I. CRIME AND TORT DEPLOYED IN MELIORISTIC LAW REFORM: A
FUNCTIONALIST VIEW
A. Dispersal
Although individuals in each movement may concentrate on one spe-
cific proposal, melioristic law reform efforts generate proposals to change
both the law of crime and the law of tort, revealing a strategy of dispersal
that is often not planned. When a social movement seeks to change both
crime and tort, it indicates that it favors real change over centralized con-
trol. Dispersal is uniquely effective: Legal change is more likely to create
social change when the power to initiate legal action-to turn on the ma-
chinery of the state-is spread between government officials and citizens.
Crime and tort describe these two spheres of power; melioristic law
reform chooses both.16 In several senses, however, crime comes first.
16 Antismoking activists crafted criminal bans on smoking by women and by mi-
nors, see RONALD J. TROYER & GERALD E. MARKLE, CIGARETTES: THE BATTLE
OVER SMOKING 34-35 (1983), as well as absolute prohibition in 14 states during the
late nineteenth century, see Tate, supra note 2, at 107. More recently, public-places
bans and other criminal-law restrictions have emerged. Tort and products-liability
lawsuits against cigarette manufacturers evolved in stages or "waves" beginning in the
1960s. Rabin, supra note 2, at 110. Despite some feminists' assertions that the crimi-
nal law does not fit the needs of those victimized by pornography, many activists have
sought to expand criminal sanctions. See, e.g., FRANKLIN M. OSANKA & SARA LEE
JOHANN, SOURCEBOOK ON PORNOGRAPHY 313-40, 390-92 (1989) (detailing ap-
proaches involving obscenity law and nuisance law, but noting the gross under-
enforcement of obscenity laws and the possible unconstitutionality of nuisance en-
forcement measures); Lori Douglass Hutchins, Note, Pornography: The Prosecution
of Pornographers Under Prostitution Statutes-A New Approach, 37 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 977, 1002 (1986) (advocating application of prostitution statutes to pornography
suppliers); Robin Morgan, How to Run the Pornographers Out of Town (and Preserve
the First Amendment), Ms., Nov. 1978, at 55, 79-80 (enumerating criminal-law strate-
gies, among other approaches).
More famous, however, has been a civil rights ordinance crafted by Andrea Dwor-
kin and Catharine MacKinnon at the request of the city of Minneapolis. The statute
would allow victims to sue for harms attributable to pornography. On the origins of
this celebrated and vilified attempt at law reform, see Paul Brest & Ann Vandenberg,
Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minne-
apolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607, 607-08 (1987) (identifying as the source of the ordinance
the "intersection" of efforts by two neighborhoods to eliminate pornographic book-
stores and theaters and the personal experiences of women whose lives had been
affected by male consumption of pornography).
Activists spurred the creation of drunk-driving crimes and highway checkpoints,
and after a national campaign helped to criminalize the sale of alcohol to persons
under the age of 21. See John R. Ashmead, Putting a Cork on Social Host Liability:
New York Rejects a Trend, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 995, 995 nn.1 & 4 (1989). In the history
of tort law, antiliquor activists are credited with the creation of dramshop acts. Mary
M. French et al., Special Project, Social Host Liability for the Negligent Acts of Intoxi-
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Crime fits more closely than tort with the intensity of reformers' ambi-
tions, and the American campaigns against pornography, smoking, and
alcoholic drinking appear to have been lured first to criminal law. A ban
stands for urgent disapproval, in its purest form. Tort usually comes later,
appearing to be something of a supplement, after reformers learn that a
ban can never work perfectly.
Functioning as instruments, crime frames the perceived social ill as a
scourge, and tort connects this scourge with harmed individuals-that is,
victim-plaintiffs, who are essential to melioristic law reform. This one-
two punch of crime and tort makes the reform somewhat dependent on
causal propositions, which activists have to assert and re-defend to the
point of irritation; 7 but the punch is powerful. Without victims, reform-
ers cannot gain imaginative attention, and in its use of victims a crime-
tort paradigm offers corrective justice redoubled, a prospect of law-based
restoration grounded in reasoning.
Melioristic law reform spurns the academic classification of crime as
public and tort as private."8 This traditional division focuses on harms
and discrete acts. For reformers, however, the relevant harm is a social
ill, public in all circumstances; and it is tort that does much of the collec-
tivist work of reform. Though "public," crime burrows inward, accusing
the individual; the "private" law of tort spreads outward, creating by its
assertion money-links between individuals, manufacturing firms, insurers,
local governments, and others. The drunk driver, especially when he or
she kills, stands for our dark heart and our causal responsibilities, we who
sell, serve, enable, condone: Friends-who-let-friends are connected to
harm. Thus to reformers, crime centers and tort diffuses. The wide reach
of the two combined suggests some of the breadth of melioristic law re-
form.
The dispersal of power between the realms of crime and tort is accom-
panied by the dispersal of power among individuals who are strangers to
one another. Decisions to create or modify crimes and torts toward one
social goal have disparate origins. Melioristic law reform, never a central-
ized movement, attracts different leaders and activists who work in sepa-
cated Guests, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1058, 1065-67 (1990) [hereinafter Special Project]
(explaining the indebtedness of modern dramshop acts to the nineteenth-century tem-
perance movement).
'7 For example, pornography defenders historically have rebuffed prohibitionists
on the basis of causation. Catharine MacKinnon argues that this linear understanding
of causation-"in the 'John hit Mary' sense"-ignores the silencing effect of pornog-
raphy. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW 156-57 (1987) (complaining also that "atomistic linear causality as a sine
qua non of injury" is a standard that prevents gender equality from developing).
18 See Robert W. Drane & David J. Neal, On Moral Justifications for the Tort!
Crime Distinction, 68 CAL. L. REV. 398, 402-03 (1980) (describing the public/private
distinction, criticism of it, and its intuitive appeal).
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rate times and places. The American antiliquor movement, for example,
metamorphosed from nineteenth-century censure to a medicalized view
of alcoholism; 9 if various leaders of this crusade had met, they might well
have loathed one another. The history of the antismoking movement
records less dissent and more common ground, but very diverse players:
King James I, who took legal measures against tobacco and wrote a fa-
mous denunciation of the substance, 0 finds twentieth-century colleagues
around the world whose credo is egalitarianism.2 The feminist campaign
against pornography is connected to antecedent reformers who worked
within obscenity law and did not care to liberate women. These differ-
ences in personnel are always so great as to leave the term "movement"
something of a misnomer.22 Reformers do not so much have common
membership as a commonly-perceived evil.'
19 ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 3, at 10-11 (discussing the transition
and showing how public policy has embraced the view that over-consumption is a
disease).
20 In 1604 James published his "Counterblaste to Tobacco":
Tobacco is a filthy weed and the custome is lothsome to the eye, hatefull to the
nose, harmefull to the braine, dangerous to the lungs, and in the blacke stinking
fume thereof, neerest resembling the horrible Stigian smoke of the pit that is
bottomelesse.
MICHAEL GROSSMAN & PHILIP PRICE, TOBACCO SMOKING AND THE LAW IN CANADA
1-1, 1-6 (1992) (internal citation omitted).
21 STEVE ALLEN & BILL ADLER, JR., THE PASSIONATE NONSMOKER'S BILL OF
RIGHTs 22-23 (1989) (equating smokefree public spaces with freedom and rights gen-
erally, and objecting to the idea of smoking as a "right").
22 Although they are "popular with the conservative constituencies that tradition-
ally favor legal restrictions on sexual expression of all kinds," anti-pornography laws
have been drafted by feminists who "oppose traditional obscenity and censorship
laws." Lisa Duggan, False Promises: Feminist Anti-Pornography Legislation, 38
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 133 (1994).
23 In an "information age," of course, activists cannot escape awareness of parallel
or related efforts, and so they confront the question of how closely to ally with one
another. Though alliances do result, melioristic law reform is always centrifugal, tend-
ing toward more dispersal. When they choose to disperse powers, reformers accept
the risk that giving legal weapons to more actors will lead to abuses. Sometimes this
inclusion of others is reluctant. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 17, at 203 (explain-
ing her choice of civil-law rather than criminal-law strategy); see also id. at 283 n.52
(discussing other benefits of a civil enforcement model). Other times reformers have
few qualms about sharing power, as is the case with antismoking campaigns. See
JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 19. TwO Australian activists have written approv-
ingly about dispersal as a strategy, adding that "the dominant culture" legitimizes
antismoking efforts by redefining smoking as a public health issue rather than a per-
sonal right. ROLAND EVERINGHAM & STEPHEN WOODWARD, TOBACCO LITIGATION:
AFC v TIA: THE CASE AGAINST PASSIVE SMOKING 16 (1991).
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B. Extralegal Sanctions
The principal extralegal sanction accompanying melioristic law reform
is shame. 4 The old-fashioned word retains tremendous force 5 and is al-
ways essential to the reform, in several ways. Before they create new
crimes and torts, reformers are inspired by revulsion or outrage. After
crimes and torts are established, stigmatization serves various supportive
and gap-filling functions; for example, stigmatization affects prosecutorial
discretion, impelling both action or inaction by the state. Because en-
forcement costs are everywhere too high to permit full use of the criminal
sanction,26 some of the general objectives of criminalization are achieved
via stigmatization. 7 Shame is engaged both before an individual decides
to commit a crime and after conviction, spreading influence into punish-
ment and rehabilitation efforts.28 Tort too is buttressed by the shaming
that precedes, follows, and accompanies litigation. 9
2 One philosopher discusses the creation of extralegal sanctions as a necessary
social process. Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Revision of Norms, 100 ETHICS 756 (1990).
25 Michael Lewis contends that shame is both "species-specific" and the most
psychically significant emotion we possess. MICHAEL LEWIS, SHAME: THE EXPOSED
SELF 2 (1992) ("[I]t encompasses the whole of ourselves . . . ."); see also Jonathan
Alter & Pat Wingert, The Return of Shame, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1995, at 21, 22 (ob-
serving that social control through shame is reemerging as a communitarian value
after suffering a decline during the 1950s and 1960s).
26 Put another way, the highest probability that a criminal will be apprehended and
successfully prosecuted occurs when there are the greatest numbers of costly police,
prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS OF LAW 225 (4th ed. 1992).
27 John Braithwaite goes further. Agreeing that shame and stigma do much of the
work of criminalization, he argues that shame and stigma ought to do much more of
this work, and criminal justice, a professional domain for lawyers, government em-
ployees, and theorists, ought to do less. To Braithwaite, the professionalization of
crime control helps to explain increases in crime rates in recent decades. JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REHABILITATION 26 (1989) ("Professional crimi-
nology, in all its major variants, can be unhelpful in maintaining a social climate ap-
propriate to crime control because in different ways its thrust is to professionalize,
systematize, scientize, and de-communitize justice.").
m Compare id. (arguing that expansion of shaming can improve the function of the
criminal law) with Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1883-84, 1943-44 (1991) (characterizing shaming practices used
in American sentencing and rehabilitation as futile and potentially cruel).
29 An early study of this phenomenon, undertaken in the late 1950s, assessed the
effect of being sued for malpractice on the careers and personal lives of physicians.
Richard D. Schwartz & Jerome H. Skolnick, 7Wo Studies of Legal Stigma, in THE
OTHER SIDE: PERSPECTIVES ON DEVIANCE 103, 111-12 (Howard S. Becker ed., 1964)
(finding no correlation between being sued for malpractice and the continued success
of the defendants' medical careers). The experience of the two of three movements
where tort actions have been brought shows that opprobrium can also be deployed as
a counterreform measure. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 124 (describing how tobacco-
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More specifically, melioristic law reform often produces a "self-enforc-
ing" criminal law or related norm, whereby the state need not exert direct
effort in policing offenders due to the force of stigma. 0 Extralegal con-
trols reinforce much of the law, not only law identified with social move-
ments, but the expansive sweep of melioristic law reform helps to build
stigmatic effects that strengthen acceptance of legal change. For example,
researchers who studied public reactions to new government measures
against cigarette smoking in the 1960s and 70s found that each change
increased the percentage of people who regarded cigarette smoking as
deviant."' Although Professor Rabin has concluded that tort lawsuits did
not have this educative and stigmatic effect, 2 one may surmise that dis-
persed activism and revisits to old themes, both characteristics of melio-
ristic law reform, helped to stigmatize smoking in a way that any single
criminal-law proclamation could not."3 The feminist anti-pornography
campaign had its clearest success in creating a norm against the consump-
seller defendants systematically portrayed plaintiffs as unattractive and noting that in
one case the defense introduced evidence that the plaintiff was "a heavy drinker
[who] lived with other women while he was married [and] had trouble holding a job")
(internal citation omitted).
Courts construe dramshop acts to deny recovery to plaintiffs whose intoxication
causes injury to themselves, despite broad language allowing a claim by "any person
injured." This narrow construction, apparently grounded in moralism, exists apart
from contributory negligence, or skewed versions of comparative negligence, both of
which favor defendants. Special Project, supra note 16, at 1069.
Andrea Dworkin argues that because victims of pornography have been kept out of
the courts and thus out of American public life, they do not hear one another's ac-
counts and remain in a state of isolated shame. ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY:
MEN POSSESSING WOMEN at xxvii-xxviii (rev. ed. 1989) (protesting the use of the
word "anecdotal" to describe the few accounts of pornography-related abuse that
have become public, because it trivializes the experience).
30 See JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 13 (noting that many antismoking laws
are "self-enforcing"); Note, A Perspective on Non-Legal Social Controls: The Sanc-
tions of Shame and Guilt in Representative Cultural Settings, 35 IND. L.J. 196, 249
(1959-1960) (asserting that guilt sanctions "are self-enforcing and require much less
expenditure of effort than would legal sanctions alone").
a1 TROYER & MARKLE, supra note 16, at 52-60. The authors add that this percep-
tion continued to climb even when newspapers started to run fewer stories about new
measures. Id. at 62-63 (but noting that, in spite of the decline, the issue of the harm-
ful health consequences of smoking remained in the public arena).
32 Rabin, supra note 2, at 126-27.
33 This point about multiple inputs suggests that Rabin comes to judgment too
hastily. Discussing law-based responses to the problem of cigarette harm, Rabin con-
trasts the successful "public health perspective" informing criminal and quasi-criminal
bans with the failed "individual rights perspective" behind tort litigation. Id. at 111.
My view of melioristic law reform precludes this kind of relative assessment, as I see
new crimes and torts as parts of a larger movement rather than end points; thus it is
always hard to tell which measures have succeeded and which failed. In any case I
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tion and approval of pornography. 4 A newer American character, the
designated driver, was created extralegally, after the changes of melioris-
tic law reform had achieved some effect; this entity exists to promote stig-
ma that serves the liquor-control movement. 35 Extralegal sanctions occu-
py a midpoint between laws and a movement that builds changes to crime
and tort.
C. The Recurring Discourse
1. Legal Versus Extralegal Measures
Extralegal sanctions function so powerfully in melioristic reform that
they compete with the entire structure of crime and tort that activists
build.36 In the view of many, social reform ought to eschew law and em-
phasize stigmatization, because of dangers present in legal control.3 7 Law
regard "the individual rights perspective" as integral to melioristic law reform. See
infra Part I.C.3.
34 Richard Randall describes the social value of pornography in terms of its stigma-
tization. By indicting pornographic portrayals of women as deviant, feminists have
helped "sharpen or reinforce what is acceptable or favored" sexually. RICHARD S.
RANDALL, FREEDOM AND TABOO: PORNOGRAPHY AND THE POLITICS OF A SELF Di-
VIDED 265 (1989); see also Ilsa Lottes et al., Reactions to Pornography on a College
Campus: For or Against?, 29 SEX ROLES 69, 84 (1993) (describing disapproval of por-
nography among college students surveyed). One survey, done in the mid-1980s,
found that 56% believed that exposure to pornography causes rape, and 54% be-
lieved that exposure to pornography causes other forms of sexual violence. EDWARD
DONNERSTEIN ET AL., THE QUESTION OF PORNOGRAPHY: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS at ix (1987). Although these majorities are narrow, they would
not have been identifiable before the feminist campaign. I offer my own impressions
about the declining acceptability of pornography among elites infra at text accompa-
nying notes 56-60.
35 The exact origins of the designated driver are unclear. Compare Edwin Dia-
mond, Guns and Poses, NEW YORK, Dec. 6, 1993, at 32 (calling concept "another
Hollywood-Harvard [School of Public Health] collaboration") with Jerry Keller, Ap-
plause and Anger, BEVERAGE WORLD, May 1994, at 4 (taking credit for the concept
on behalf of "the beer industry"). Undisputed, however, is the secondary nature of
this creation: The designated driver arose in the United States only after activists had
fashioned crimes and torts.
36 This competition is related to confusion over when law ends and non-legal forms
of ordering in society begin. For discussion of this question, and a good resolution,
see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the "Social Scientific" Concept of Legal Plural-
ism, 20 J. L. & Soc'y 192, 212 (1993) (protesting against pluralists' use of the word
"law" to describe "lived patterns of normative ordering").
Commenting on a draft version of this Paper, my colleague Richard McAdams
notes that extralegal and legal sanctions interrelate in another way: In a law-centered
society, attempts to revise prominent laws can provide momentum and publicity for
struggling social movements. By taking on the venerated First Amendment, for in-
stance, feminists ensured attention and generated discussion.
37 On feminist concerns, see infra note 74 and accompanying text. On anti-legalist
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to these observers appears secondary to the mission of changing society.
Reformers disagree." The fundamental characteristic of melioristic law
reform is its belief that law, particularly crime and tort, can solve social
problems by influencing the behavior of individuals. Although crime and
tort are basic to this task, extralegal forces are indispensable to making
law effective at every stage of the reform. A debate over which type of
measure works better is never resolved; melioristic law reform needs
both.
2. Leaders
Melioristic law reform is often, but not always, identified with individu-
als. Foremost, these persons lack a financial stake in the reform, appear-
ing often reluctant, almost ascetic. Although they often specialize in
either criminal-law or tort proposals, leaders of the movement seldom
distance themselves from-indeed often endorse-measures in which
they do not specialize. Their support of both crime and tort establishes
their bona fides, because although it is easy to imagine speaking out of
avarice for a change in either crime or tort (financial interests might in-
clude attorneys' revenues, new prison construction, expansions of sub-
stance-abuse treatment facilities, and so forth), few who want to make
money would invest their energy toward changes in both tort and crimi-
nal law.
In favoring both crime and tort, reformers reveal their desire to intrude
into private lives and individual decisionmaking, for the good of
strangers. Melioristic law reform thus can showcase leaders who are
frankly meddlesome, and who appear fanatic and humorless.39 A para-
concerns as stated by Mary Ann Glendon, see infra notes 67-71 and accompanying
text.
38 "Forget law, educate-as if law is not educational," Catharine MacKinnon
wrote, describing tersely this strain of questioning and criticism. MAcKINNON, supra
note 17, at 223.
39 The theme of humorlessness is often explored in popular writing about melioris-
tic law reform. Antismoking efforts, feminist crusaders, and antiliquor activists are
mocked in, respectively, CHRISTOPHER BUCKLEY, THANK YOU FOR SMOKING 3
(1994) (satirizing antismoking activists as "dedicated haters"); FLORENCE KING,
WHEN SISTERHOOD WAS IN FLOWER 1 (1982) (recounting the narrator's story of be-
ing "shanghaied into the feminist movement"); and the 1932 Broadway melodrama,
Carry Nation; see also SAMUEL L. LEITER, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NEW YORK
STAGE, 1930-1940 at 114-15 (1989) (describing the nineteenth-century temperance fa-
natic of the title, who attacked saloons with a hatchet "after receiving what she
claimed to be a divine revelation"). Also blowing in the zeitgeist are "feminazis," a
Benson & Hedges ad campaign that ridicules public-places bans, and the rock group
DAMM, or Drunks Against Mad Mothers. As a counterreform tactic, calling law
reformers humorless-especially if they happen to be feminists-seems effective, or
so I concluded after my research on the creation of sexual harassment law. Anita
Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1227, 1278 n.248, 1306-
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dox emerges: To forestall cynicism about their motives, leaders need their
grim and ascetic personae; but melioristic law reform is also a manifesta-
tion of American optimism, and American social movements that hope to
achieve change must show themselves to be capable of change, of lighten-
ing up. After many years of effort on behalf of melioristic law reform,
leaders either begin to work differently,' start to condemn the extremism
and intransigence of their cause, 4' or harden in their commitment and
allow change to occur in the form of new claimants to the title of leader-
ship.42
A related paradox is that melioristic law reform cannot begin without
leadership, but also cannot maintain it. Failed movements send their
leaders into obscurity; a successful movement spreads legal change, and
thus consciousness, away from its center. The centrifugal nature of melio-
ristic law reform, among other circumstances, forces each leader in the
movement to work with much less money, personnel, publicity, and disci-
pline than the magnitude of her project would seem to require. But this
dispersal is also an opportunity for individuals. Specific proposals con-
cerning crime and tort give leaders canvasses small enough to paint, while
a bigger picture grows around them.
07 (1994) (noting the prevalence of anti-feminist rhetoric that chastises feminist wo-
men for being "humorless," "joyless," and "puritanical").
40 A good example of this type of leader, although his work is not discussed here, is
Ralph Nader. For a summary of his activities in melioristic law reform, see Murray
Fisher, Ralph Nader, Consumer Rights Crusader, PLAYBOY, Jun. 1992, at 53, 53 (not-
ing that Nader switched tactics from agitation to participation by placing his name on
the 1992 presidential ballot).
41 Candy Lightner, first the grieving mother-against-drunk-driving and later the
worldly public figure who took a job lobbying for the liquor industry, exemplifies this
choice. Walt Wiley, Candy Lightner's New Cause, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 18, 1994,
at B1 (listing the organizations Lightner has affiliated herself with, including the Bev-
erage Institute, Americans Against Crime, and the American-Arab Anti-Discrimina-
tion Committee).
42 Dworkin and MacKinnon have been so widely mocked and challenged that a
Time magazine writer referred to them as the Al Sharpton and Louis Farrakhan of
the women's movement. Lance Morrow, Men: Are They Really That Bad?, TIME,
Feb. 14, 1994, at 52, 58 (also noting that MacKinnon and Dworkin are "convenient
targets for antifeminists"). Many writers put themselves forward as new, revisionist
feminists, who would cure the excesses of their predecessors. See, e.g., RENE
DENFIELD, THE NEW VICrORIANS: A YOUNG WOMAN'S CHALLENGE TO THE OLD
FEMINIST ORDER 10-11 (1995) (arguing that young women are abandoning the wo-
men's movement because it clings to an oppressive vision of womanhood); CAMILLE
PAGLIA, VAMPS AND TRAMPS: NEW ESSAYS 107 (1994) (titling one chapter "The Re-
turn of Carry Nation: Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin"); CHRISTINA H.
SOMMERS, WHO STOLE FEMINISM? How WOMEN HAVE BETRAYED WOMEN 275
(1994) (foretelling the demise of the "gender feminism" of Susan Faludi, Gloria
Steinem, and others, in favor of a new wave of "equity feminism" that wisely aban-
dons "militant gynocentrism and misandrism").
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3. Positive Liberty
These leaders relate uneasily to the notion of liberty, a powerful word
to the pluralistic and progressivist constituencies they must convince.a
On the one hand, they regard their cause as consistent with individual
freedom." On the other hand, melioristic law reform seeks influence
over every force affecting social order-that is, crime, tort, and extralegal
sources of authority-and this big grab, for its sheer ambition, looks ty-
rannical. It is only partly effective for spokespersons to say that they are
poor, financially outmatched, or obscure, too humble to exert control.45
They must also state their agenda in terms that comport with some con-
cept of freedom.
This tension means that proponents of melioristic law reform are con-
tinually obliged to explain how their ambitions fit within a traditional
view of liberty that is negative and tends to regard laws, especially new
laws, as obstacles, barriers, and restrictions. 46 Opposing the anti-tobacco
campaign, the cigarette industry achieved its best success by positing a
(limited) right to smoke and appealing to freedom.47 As portrayed in the
media and public commentary, feminist attacks on pornography are
countered almost exclusively by civil libertarians.48 Antiliquor activists
43 John Stuart Mill adverted to the complexity of "liberty" when he wrote that
"when society is itself the tyrant-society collectively over the separate individuals
who compose it-its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may
do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own
mandates." J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 4 (Blackwell's 1948) (1859).
44 See, e.g., ALLEN & ADLER, supra note 21, at 18-19, 22-23 (explaining that the
non-smokers' rights movement has achieved legislative successes, even in the face of
the powerful tobacco lobby, because there is no cognizable right to smoke).
45 In this sense debates over melioristic law reform resemble the discourse about
political correctness, voluminously reported in the media during the early 1990s, when
representatives of each side called themselves beleaguered and their opponents tyran-
nical. For a compilation of essays supporting and opposing "political correctness,"
particularly in educational settings, see DEBATING P.C.: THE CONTROVERSY OVER
POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON CAMPUSES 1 (Paul Berman ed., 1992) (attributing the
first shot in the debate to a 1990 New York Times article).
46 This tension in the feminist anti-pornography movement appears as a constitu-
tional dilemma: First Amendment-type freedom to produce and consume pornogra-
phy thwarts women's efforts at gaining full political, social, and economic equality.
MACKINNON, supra note 17, at 166 ("Equality for women is incompatible with a defi-
nition of men's freedom that is at our expense.").
47 See JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 16-17 (calling this tactic "clearly more
effective than continued reliance on contesting the scientific evidence"). For an at-
tack on this counterreform device, see EVERINGHAM & WOODWARD, supra note 23,
at 26 (reprinting sections of an advertisement published by the Tobacco Institute
claiming "little evidence and nothing which proves scientifically that cigarette smok-
ing causes disease in non-smokers").
48 Nadine Strossen described the feminist-libertarian opposition:
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have been challenged to reconcile the right to buy liquor with the obliga-
tion to be drafted, or treated as an adult in the criminal courts.49
Activists are not at liberty, as it were, to disdain freedom as a value;
instead they claim this value as their own. Antipornography crusaders
allude to physical integrity (i.e. freedom from rape and degradation);"0
antismoking activists portray cigarette smoke, rather than their own bans
and lawsuits, as an aggressor;51 the antiliquor campaign looks forward to
roads free from drunk drivers (i.e. the right to rely on all others behind a
wheel), while away from the specifics of drunk driving, persons who favor
increased legal sanctions for the harms caused by alcohol often advert to
the alcoholic's intimates, the ranks of Al-Anon and the "codependent,"
who have rights, too.52 In building these arguments, melioristic law re-
form seeks to broaden the existing dominant paradigm of "freedom
from" to address more interests, values, and aggrieved persons.53
We adamantly oppose any effort to restrict sexual speech not only because it
would violate our cherished First Amendment freedoms... but also because it
would undermine our equality, our status, our dignity, and our autonomy.
NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX AND THE FIGHT
FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS 14 (1995); see also id. at 59-106 (describing ACLU efforts);
SUSAN M. EASTON, THE PROBLEM OF PORNOGRAPHY: REGULATION AND THE RIGHT
TO FREE SPEECH 71 (1994) (describing the efforts of the Feminist Anti-Censorship
Task Force ("FACT"), and likening the feminist anti-pornography campaign to the
fatwa against Salman Rushdie).
49 See Rupert Cornwell, Out of America: Land of the Free Besotted by Tight Drink
Law, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 3, 1993, at 15 (speculating that the high
drinking age may be a holdover from Prohibition, an expression of American puritan-
ism, or a quid pro quo for a lower driving age).
50 See DWORKIN, supra note 29, at 224 ("We will know that we are free when the
pornography no longer exists."); cf. Marianne Wesson, Sex, Lies and Videotape: The
Pornographer as Censor, 66 WASH. L. REV. 913, 918 (1991) (observing the "significant
incidence of... instrumental uses of pornography as a tool of coercion, intimidation,
and abuse" against women, namely by sex offenders).
51 See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 870 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. La. 1994) (alleg-
ing that industry altered and misdescribed the nature of tobacco in cigarettes); Irene
Scharf, Breathe Deeply: The Tort of Smokers' Battery, 32 Hous. L. REV. 615 (1995)
(arguing that exposure to cigarette smoke can constitute intentional harmful contact).
52 But see Dean R. Gerstein, Alcohol Use and Consequence, in ALCOHOL AND
PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 3, at 182, 216-18 (concluding that little recent evidence
supports the "imagery that pits drinking against the family," and noting a positive
correlation between consumption and income).
53 See generally DAVID BOLLIER & JOAN CLAYBROOK, FREEDOM FROM HARM:
THE CIVILIZING INFLUENCE OF HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULA-
TION at vii (1986) (characterizing the "freedom of victims" as morally superior to the
"corporate taxonomy" that emphasizes the costs of regulation); BURTON A. WEIS-
BROD ET AL., PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
(1978) (reconciling economic-analysis perspectives with the goals of public interest
law).
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II. MELIORISTIc LAW REFORM AS DEMOCRATIC EXPRESSION
In a democracy, citizens contribute to the writing and change of law.
Thus, if democracy exists, then struggles to change the law of crime and
tort are forms of democratic expression. Changing the law of crime and
tort requires persuasion, cooperation, alliances, compromise, and interde-
pendence-all characteristics of democracy. Melioristic law reform re-
sembles other examples of a broad kind of democratic expression (broad,
that is, in the sense of not being confined to the vote, or majoritarianism)
such as petitions to the government, the financing of political campaigns,
the elimination of structural obstacles to voting, political speech, and oth-
er initiatives.
Various writers, however, have challenged the claim that law reform is
democratic expression. The antipluralist literature uses an attack on law
reform to express a larger quarrel with progressivism and pluralism, and
its skepticism about law reform extends to doubting that democracy ex-
ists. Antipluralist traditions maintain that law reform originates at the
top, or from the middle of a circle.54 There are no social movements,
only force. This disbelief in the possibility of genuine law reform echoes
Marx's themes of false consciousness and historical materialism, while the
suggestion that concentric designs underlie pluralism recalls Foucault.55
14 To some writers, for example, law reform is "part of the inevitable reproduction
of the 'order of things'," LACOMBE, supra note 1, at 9 (internal citation omitted); the
state constructs social problems and then proffers law reform as their solution, with
the aim of achieving greater control. Id. at 10. The apparent pluralism behind melio-
ristic law reform is illusory to those who find a centralizing ideology behind institu-
tions such as schools, the family, and neighborhoods. See STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS
OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND CLASSIFICATION 77 (1985). Others
contend that citizens' power to achieve change is absolutely bounded by caste, "the
original sin of superstratification." DON MIXON, OBEDIENCE AND CIVILIZATION: Au-
THORIZED CRIME AND THE NORMALITY OF EVIL 65, 73 (1989). Antipluralism, in this
descriptive sense, also exists on the right and center-right, most conspicuously in eco-
nomics-tinged political theory. To take an example from the antiliquor chronicles,
one explanation of both Prohibition and Repeal vigorously rejects sociological theses
to contend that both the banning and unbanning of the sale of liquor were done to
increase tax revenues. Donald J. Bourdreaux & A.C. Pritchard, The Price of Prohibi-
tion, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1994). Similarly, public choice theory, and perhaps
rational choice theory as well, is committed to the notion that people have differing
tastes, which sounds like pluralism in its description yet conflicts with my claims about
the functions of idealism and self-sacrifice in melioristic law reform.
55 Professor Lacombe suggests that any theory of the melioristic possibilities of law
reform must necessarily grapple with the work of Foucault, who understood the con-
cept of reform as social control disguised as change. Not surprisingly, Lacombe finds
in Foucault both refutation of and support for her claims. LACOMBE, supra note 1, at
10 (finding Foucault's definition of reform inconsistent with his descriptions of resist-
ance and the emergence of nontraditional values).
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Unlike "the rhetoric of reaction," which finds law reform harmful or use-
less, antipluralist criticism believes that it is simply a charade.
The thesis of this Paper accommodates this radical doubt in some mea-
sure, while also urging observers to allow the experience of melioristic
law reform to temper their theorizing. Space constraints and other limi-
tations prevent me from refuting antipluralist skepticism about law re-
form. I have had a chance, however, to allude to the history of three
crusades. This history suggests that social movements-which are the
antecedents of melioristic law reform-are vibrant, significant in their ef-
fects, and diverse in their origins. The achievements of melioristic law
reform provide some evidence for the existence-and the instrumental
benefits-of progressivism and pluralism in the United States. Consider
four points.
First, although all three causes continue, they have also achieved re-
sults-outcomes that are jagged over time, with setbacks and gains, not a
neat split between pro and contra. These rough spoils look like the result
of a tussle in a democracy. Regarding pornography, neither the criminal
nor the tort/civil rights approaches propounded by law reformers have
been used significantly, with obscenity and other crimes not prosecuted
much more often than before the feminist onslaught in the late 1970s;6
and the MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance was nullified by the courts. 7
Yet unquestionably pornography has gone into retreat among the re-
spectable and the visible. In upmarket books and journals, some gay
men, lesbians, and self-declared feminist women applaud pornography,58
but heterosexual men in high places distance themselves from the stuff, 9
and are often quick to agree that it harms women.60 College film socie-
56 See RANDALL, supra note 34, at 220-21 (explaining why prosecution of obsceni-
ty crimes is seldom used to control pornography). Moreover, those convicted on ob-
scenity charges often receive only a minimal sentence. 1986 ATT'Y GEN. COMM'N
FINAL REP. 370-71.
57 See American Booksellers Assn., Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir.
1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (holding the statutory definition of pornogra-
phy unconstitutional because it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint).
58 See STROSSEN, supra note 48, at 15; Jeffrey G. Sherman, Love Speech: The Social
Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L. REV. 661, 662 (1995) (arguing that gay male por-
nography should be valued as a social good because it enables its consumers "to lead
fulfilling lives").
59 See, e.g., JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF
CLARENCE THOMAS 271, 329-30 (1994) (reporting the horrified reaction of Clarence
Thomas to accusations that he was an avid consumer of pornography); Sherman,
supra note 58, at 685 (suggesting that such dissociation causes psychological harms).
60 Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329-30 (conceding arguendo that pornography is as harmful
as feminist activists claim); accord ATr'Y GEN. COMM'N, supra note 56, at 324-26
(acknowledging causal relationship between exposure to sexually violent pornogra-
phy and aggressive behavior towards women). But see LACOMBE, supra note 1, at 81-
83 (summarizing conclusions of Canada's Fraser Committee, including its dismissal of
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ties no longer present pornographic features as banners of sophistication,
as they did when I was a student in the late 1970s. A mixed outcome: by
no means a tie. Crime and tort measures have been more successful for
the antismoking cause than for the feminist attack on pornography-one
cigarette ban follows another in the United States, and tort suits about
cigarettes, though not yet successful with juries, have accomplished more
than tort suits about pornography-but this result too is uneven and
shifting. Suppliers and enemies of cigarettes agree on no middle ground.
With liquor, a reasonably fair fight of haters-versus-makers, dry against
wet, is even plainer. Although the crimes and the torts of abusing liquor,
or furnishing it carelessly, have been established, this movement has
reached barriers.6 ' Again, I do not claim that melioristic law reform has
led to the identification of a happy middle between activists and pariahs.
The point is only that these three debates may be seen as political battles,
as vital as many in the American democratic arena.
Second, as Dany Lacombe concluded in her chapter called "The En-
abling Quality of Law Reform," that study of melioristic law reform
"should warn us against reifying the 'state,' against depicting it as a uni-
fied entity above social relations that represses or monopolizes social
agents."62 At its most successful, melioristic law reform sketches a state
that follows MacKinnon's prescription of more attention to the personal
experiences of individuals.6" At a minimum it points to the fissures in any
construction of the state as monolith. What, for instance, does this entity
think of cigarette smoking?64 Comparable variables vex the question
about the antiliquor crusade; there is no obvious side for the state to
back. And the question of what the state thinks of pornography as a
feminist issue is at least equally complex or ironic.65
Third, the experience of melioristic law reform reveals the flexibility of
liberalism in a democratic state. Liberalism can stretch to coexist with, if
the anti-pornography women's movement's claim that violent pornography leads to
aggression against women).
61 Special Project, supra note 16, at 1108 (discussing a state court case in which the
court limited social host liability to situations when the host directly served the guest);
Wiley, supra note 41, at B1 (alluding to Candy Lightner's differences with MADD).
62 LACOMBE, supra note 1, at 139.
63 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agen-
da for Theory, 7 SIGNs 515, 543 (1982) (noting that feminist method seeks to reconsti-
tute experience as theory).
64 On the one hand, consider Medicare savings attributable to premature death,
tax revenues, symbolic support of a unifying cultural symbol, and a tame outlet for
mild rebelliousness; on the other hand, tobacco subsidies, grave losses in productivity
and national health, and the coercive and punishing effects of smoke onto citizens
who do not choose it.
65 This is so unless one agrees with MacKinnon's angry suggestion that nearly eve-
ry political agent not enrolled in her cause is simply a pimp or a collaborator. See
MAcKINNON, supra note 17, at 204-05 (mentioning feminist lawyers and the ACLU).
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not foster, two other concepts that have been posited as its antagonists:
communitarianism and a wider definition of liberty that includes positive
rights.66 This flexibility is widely misperceived. To Mary Ann Glendon,
for instance, legal and extralegal-communal sources of social order com-
pete in a zero-sum contest. As law increases, "unofficial social controls"
diminish in force.67 Glendon condemns the rise of legalism in the United
States, which may have expanded since Tocqueville first noticed it, 8 as an
eroder of family authority, custom, neighborly relations, and even the
power of etiquette.69 But the experience of melioristic law reform testi-
fies against this rigid division between community and liberal legalism.
To be sure, any individual decision to seek redress through litigation,
rather than through some alternative, does express an either-or choice.
Glendon could have condemned the conditions that impel Americans to
make that choice. Instead, wavering on what exactly she finds objection-
able in the current American legal landscape, ° Glendon veers from this
target.71 Her attack on legalism neglects the possibility that modifying
66 See Chantal Mouffe, Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community, in
RADICAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 12, at 225, 231 (arguing that ideals of citizenship
can be consistent with "the priority of the right over the good"); SUSAN M. OKIN,
WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 282 (1992) (arguing that the liberalism/
communitarianism dichotomy, frequently noted in the 1980s, misdescribes liberalism);
Quentin Skinner, The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Perspec-
tives, in PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY 193, 202-08 (Richard Rorty et al. eds., 1984) (citing
Machiavelli, among others, to contend that modern concepts of liberty are compatible
with civic engagement and virtue).
67 MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 267 (1994).
68 De Tocqueville observed:
The spirit of the law, born within schools and courts, spreads little by little be-
yond them; it infiltrates through society right down to the lowest ranks, till finally
the whole people have contracted some of the ways and tastes of a magistrate.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (George Laurence trans.,
J.P. Mayer ed., 1969) (1835-1840).
69 See id. 257-79 (labeling American society "One Vast School of Law").
70 Most of Glendon's book attacks the proliferation of lawsuits and legalism gener-
ally. GLENDON, supra note 67, at 3 ("our law-dependent polity"); id. at 221 (noting
critically "an increase in the demand for judicial services") (internal citation omitted);
id. at 275 (blaming "legal opinion leaders" for "peddling an idea of law that promised
too much"). But near the end of A Nation Under Lawyers she appears to retreat:
What is problematic is not the amount so much as the quality of the new law that
is being produced; not the number of lawyers so much as the way they imagine
their roles; not the rise in litigation so much as the peculiar uses to which the
courts are being put.
Id. at 274. Elsewhere she simply alludes to malaise. See, e.g., id. at 14 (noting the
"great sadness" of contemporary American lawyers).
71 As the political scientist Anna-Maria Marshall has pointed out to me in conver-
sations, Gerald Rosenberg is similarly shortsighted in The Hollow Hope, where he
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crimes and torts can be a communal function, extending well beyond any
particular conflict brought to the courts.
Far from on the one hand empowering an atomistic man who wants to
be free from anything he dislikes, or on the other hand turning all of
society into an absolutist gulag, melioristic law reform invokes liberal ide-
als and sets them loose. Individuals who begin with an idea behind mel-
ioristic law reform can build a community: The phrases "secondhand
smoke" and "mothers [or students] against drunk driving," for instance,
which are media clichds to many of us, have also been sources of friend-
ship and comfort. Melioristic law reform also builds second-generation
communities: If averse to Women Against Pornography,72 one can join
the Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force.73 Of course, the creation of
each new collective does not necessarily improve on the immediate past.
But given their status as players in a democracy and their disconnection
from, or at least independence of, powerful organizations, new collectives
that arise as a result of melioristic law reform are unlikely to be serious
menaces. At their best they can contribute significantly to human flour-
ishing.
Melioristic law reform threatens more traditional notions of liberalism
only when fragments of the movement join to create a powerful entity
that imperils the life-plans of individuals who are less powerful than the
reform. Many feminists, for instance, fear that legal force mixed with the
feminist opposition to pornography yields a powerful and repressive
chemistry that will ultimately leave women badly harmed. 74 The student
argues that because celebrated Supreme Court decisions like Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), have had only
partial success in furthering the goals of social reformers who brought these cases, it
has been demonstrated that "the courts" cannot "bring about social change." ROSEN-
BERG, supra note 5, at 82. Even if Rosenberg's empirical findings are complete and
correct (a debated point), law reform movements are not summed up, or encapsu-
lated, in one famous case. The civil rights movement, for instance, used crime, tort,
and extralegal sanctions in thousands of settings, and the phrase "Brown v. Board of
Education" is often only shorthand, or synecdoche.
72 Andrea Dworkin also mentions Women Against Violence in Pornography and
Media, Women Against Violence Against Women, People Against Pornography,
Feminists Against Pornography, and Women Against Sexist Violence in Pornography
and Media. DwoRKIN, supra note 29, at 225-26.
7a On FACT, see Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist
Anti-Censorship Task Force et al., in American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hud-
nut, 21 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 69, 69-75 (1988) (providing history of the organization).
74 See CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 139 (1989) (contending
that women's "demand for legal rights is now problematic"); Marianne Wesson, Girls
Should Bring Lawsuits Everywhere... Nothing Will Be Corrupted: Pornography as
Speech and Product, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 845, 871 (1993) (observing the reservations of
many feminists about using "male-originated power against continuing male domi-
nance and violence"). Margaret Atwood's celebrated feminist dystopia, The Hand-
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commentator John M. Faust argues that antiliquor efforts imposed a
price-on individual expression and even group-based notions of the
self-that has been devalued by observers who did not have to pay it. 75 I
do not mean to join the ranks of reformers who advocate legal change
with blithe disregard of its cost. It is important, however, not to overlook
the benefits, even the benefits for "liberals," of law reform; among them
is often an expanded concept of freedom.
Critics may continue to think it Orwellian for activists to characterize
their projects as freeing, but life has moved on; we now know about
externalities, 76 the trouble with thinking about eighteenth-century-style
rights of "man,"" the carcinogenic vectors that almost certainly extrude
from a burning cigarette, 78 and the highway as social construct. 79
Although a definition of liberty, to this liberal, cannot be manipulated to
deny all separation between an individual and the collective, melioristic
law reform has not really gone so far, despite its critics' anxiety. An elas-
tic word has been extended, in a constructive manner; at the same time,
the original virtues of liberalism have not yet been harmed.
Fourth and finally, melioristic law reform adds a dash of instability to a
political system that is always in danger of becoming stagnant. Because
this trace is, after all, melioristic rather than revolutionary, the Marxist
objection to law reform-that it conceals class-based absolute power, or
forestalls truly radical action-retains force for those who are genuinely
committed to revolution. This minority view aside, citizens in general
benefit from the potential for change that melioristic law reform offers,
especially in the American political system, which like all other political
systems rewards stasis.80
maid's Tale, may be read as an allegory about the same harm to women. Wesson,
supra at 848 (interpreting the novel as a critique of the feminist anti-pornography
movement).
75 See Faust Note, supra note 3, at 772-73. More specific objections have been
aimed at some drunk-driving laws, whose per se rules about blood alcohol levels
make it impossible in many cases for drivers to know whether they are violating the
law, and thus constrain behavior in an unprincipled way. See Philip J. Cook, A Soci-
olegal Problem, Sci., Jul. 29, 1988, at 603, 603 (reviewing SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE
DRINKING DRIVER (Michael D. Laurence et al., eds. 1988)).
76 See WEISBROD, supra note 53, at 404-05 (discussing third-party effects of eco-
nomic behavior).
77 See LACOMBE, supra note 1, at 151 (describing the Enlightenment affinity for
defining social systems with reference to the "rights of man").
78 See generally Maria Okonska, Legal Aspects of Passive Smoking: An Annotated
Bibliography, 86 LAW LIBR. J. 445 (1994) (cataloguing major works, including EPA
study and seminal research first published in New England Journal of Medicine).
79 See Chad Rubel, Why Dog It? Trains Are Better, MARKETING NEWS, Feb. 13,
1995, at 9 (arguing that although Amtrak is castigated as a socialistic failure, it is the
federal highway system that deserves this opprobrium).
80 See Sheldon Wolin, What Revolutionary Action Means Today, in RADICAL DE-
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In the United States, access to lawmaking both evidences and expands
power. Without the disruptive and subversive pressure of forces like mel-
ioristic law reform, law would remain in the control of the entrenched.
Melioristic law reform, being fundamentally about change-social change
coupled with new law-shifts power distributions in several ways. The
movement unites disparate individuals and frames new communities. 81
Specific proposals concerning crime and tort divide, reshape, and rebuild
constituencies, generating new groups or strengthening existing affilia-
tions.82 Melioristic law reform also can be destructive: By barging into
individual lives, it challenges (although seldom in a direct way) such fix-
tures of liberal political theory as the public-private distinction and the
unitary nature of the patriarchal family. This grouping-and-regrouping is
the essence of political power. As the political scientist Sheldon Wolin
has pointed out, relationships-"family, friends, church, neighborhood,
workplace, community, town, city"-give power to political beings, not
only in the sense of being:
able to effect decisive changes; [political power] also means the ca-
pacity to receive power, to be acted upon, to change, and be
changed. From a democratic perspective, power is not simply force
that is generated; it is experience, sensibility, wisdom, even melan-
choly distilled from the diverse relations and circles we move with-
in.83
In this expansive view of political power, melioristic law reform is a
kind of energy that presses against stasis, paralysis in government, alli-
ances that are no longer vital, and anachronistic rules. The powerful
combination of crime and tort intensifies the energy that goes with all
political movements. As long as democracy and pluralism persist, even in
attenuation, this force cannot be stored or channeled.
MOCRACY, supra note 12, at 240, 242-44 (describing stasis in American politics, trace-
able to the founding documents of the United States).
81 See LACOMBE, supra note 1, at 138 (asserting that individual anti-pornography
advocates, acting as social agents, formed "new collective identities," and evidence
"the enabling quality of the law reform process").
82 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (alluding to feminist division and
regrouping over pornography); cf Lawrence Rand, A Different Road, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 22, 1995, § 5, at 1, 5 (describing Quad A, a spinoff of Alcoholics Anonymous
oriented away from religion and offering "a feminine approach to alcoholism"). A
class-action lawsuit by nonsmoking flight attendants against cigarette sellers has
brought together a group of similarly-situated workers for whom unionization has not
been completely successful. Broin v. Philip Morris Co., Inc., 641 So.2d 888 (Fla. App.
1994) (remanding with instructions to reinstate the class).
83 Wolin, supra note 80, at 251-52.
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CONCLUSION
By "better living through crime and tort," this Paper has referred to
social movements that seek to improve the lives of individuals through
the intrusive and challenging avenue of what I have called melioristic law
reform. The distinguishing trait of melioristic law reform efforts is their
interest in changing both crime and tort. I noted other identifying condi-
tions, and offered some praise for these efforts.
Because some of this apologia applies to other types of law reform and
to social movements generally, however, I ought also to defend my taxo-
nomical project. Why sub-distinguish "melioristic law reform" when law
reform and social activism, both relatively clear concepts, cover much of
the same terrain? Put another way, what is distinctive about social move-
ments that choose to change both crime and tort? In the introduction I
raised the a fortiori argument that because melioristic law reform uses
both crime and tort it is the most comprehensive type of law reform; thus
if it can be defended against the charge of overaggressiveness, then all of
law reform is thereby defended. But a few more words of defense may be
necessary, at both a particular and a general level.
The particularistic response focuses on the identifying characteristics of
law reform concerned with both crime and tort, and insists that they are
salient. For example, my criteria exclude from melioristic law reform
such business-based initiatives as regulatory rollback and tort reform.
This boundary-setting is part of a current debate about firms as public
actors. To be sure, trying to distinguish which efforts in American politics
are led by "people" and which by "business" may be a foolish enterprise,
as Justice Scalia has written,"4 but case law and scholarly writing suggest
that the task is significant.85 At a tactical level, the classification offered
here could interest activists who are participating in or resisting melioris-
tic law reform efforts, and want to proceed aided by theory. More gener-
ally, diverse social movements can fall within my definition of melioristic
law reform-consumerism, abortion crusades pro and con, recovered-
memories-about-sexual-abuse pro and con, environmentalism-and it is
useful to learn in what ways they are alike.
Still more generally-perhaps wishfully-one can think of melioristic
84 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 685 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (characterizing the distinction as "entirely irrational").
35 Following a suggestion from my colleague Richard Hasen, I am alluding to cam-
paign finance law. In Austin, where Scalia did not prevail, the Supreme Court upheld
a statute limiting corporate campaign expenditures, distinguishing corporations from
human persons for this purpose. 494 U.S. at 659-60. Explorations of this problem
include Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S 197, 207
(1982) (noting the concern that corporations might exact promises from legislators via
strategic use of "war chest" funds); see also CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 209 (1993) (characterizing the constitutional standard for
corporate speech as "especially rn-developed").
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law reform as part of a larger taxonomy of law reform and social move-
ments, an invitation to more refined labeling, and a spur to further empir-
ical investigation about whether better living has indeed been achieved
through crime and tort. We know so little about law reform. In the Unit-
ed States, where most melioristic law reformers like to think of them-
selves as heirs of abolitionists and civil rights heroes, who are the real
heirs and who are the pretenders? If melioristic law reform is indeed part
of the wealth of a democracy, how much is it worth vis-A-vis its costs?
Where has law reform bungled? Throughout this Paper I have men-
tioned political faith. But melioristic law reform is ultimately a call to
action.
